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Highlights: 
 Canadian banks equity returns are positively impacted by contemporaneous (and lagged) 
yield curve shifts. 
 Canadian bank equity returns have become more sensitive to changes in yield curve 
spreads in the post 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
 Equity returns of Canadian banks tend to react in an asymmetric manner to changes in the 
yield curve (i.e., yield curve spreads above their mean values elicit a greater impact on 
bank equity returns than yield curve spreads that are below their mean values over our 
sample time horizon). 
 Yield curve swings could induce shifts in banks’ profit-seeking behavior towards non-
interest income sources. 
 Our findings suggest that portfolio managers need to be aware of the sensitivity of bank 
equity returns to changes in the yield curve given the potential implementation of a yield 












Abstract: We examine the reaction of Canadian banks equity returns to changes in yield curve 
spreads. We find that Canadian banks equity returns are positively impacted by 
contemporaneous (and lagged) yield curve spreads. Our results also suggest that Canadian banks 
have become more sensitive to changes in the slope of the yield curve in the post 2007-2009 
financial crisis. We also find an asymmetric impact of the slope of the yield curve on Canadian 
bank equity returns. For equity investors, the yield curve’s relevance varies with spread-
maturities. Our findings have important implications for the estimations of banks’ cost of capital 
and implicitly suggest regulatory incentives in favor of macro-prudential policy to evaluate bank 
risk.  Swings in yield curve spreads could induce shifts in banks’ profit-seeking behavior towards 
non-interest income sources.  
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An important consequence of the unconventional monetary policy intervention, in 
response to the global financial crisis (2007-2009), was an induced change in the slope of the 
yield curve under near-zero policy interest rates. The impact of this policy intervention changed 
the banking operating environment and serves to motivate this research. Unlike many European 
and American banks, the Canadian banking system remained strong and stable during the global 
financial crisis (GFC) as they did not require any form of a bailout; moreover, their regulatory 
system received praise from many countries and global institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).1 Because of the apparent success of the Canadian banking system, it is 
worthwhile to investigate how changes in yield curve spreads affect Canadian banks’ equity 
returns and whether findings differ from previous studies on U.S. and European banks. Given the 
specific nature of the Canadian banking system, it is particularly interesting to focus on the post- 
GFC low interest rate environment. The bulk of the past research on the yield curve and bank 
                                                          












equity returns focuses on the U.S. and European banking systems (e.g. Schuermann and Stiroh, 
2006, Viale et al., 2009, Baek and Bilson, 2015 and Ferrer et al., 2016).  This paper departs from 
the U.S. and European centric samples and focusses on the impact of yield curve spreads on 
equity returns for the Canadian banking system. The aim of the paper is to provide evidence on 
how a small-open economy with a highly regulated banking sector reacts to changes in the slope 
of the yield curve. Canada provides an interesting financial services landscape to evaluate this 
research due to the concentrated nature of the Canadian banking sector and its historical 
resilience to financial crisis.  
Another country with banking sector characteristics that are similar to the Canadian 
banking sector is Australia; both of these banking sectors performed well during the GFC. Allen 
et al. (2011) provides a detailed comparison of Canadian and Australian banks following the 
GFC in order to better understand why Canadian and Australian banks performed relatively well 
during the GFC. Their paper identifies a number of factors, including the past conservatism of 
Canadian and Australian regulatory requirements regarding capital adequacy, the lack of 
compromised lending standards, and a focus on domestic lending. Advocates for a Canadian-
type banking system argue that this success is the outcome of industry structure and strong 
regulation.2  
This study explores the following research questions: (1) Do changes in the slope of the 
yield curve impact equity returns of publicly-traded Canadian banks? (2) Do changes in yield 
curve spreads have an asymmetric impact on bank stock returns and does the impact gradually 
                                                          
2 The reasoning behind why the Canadian financial markets faired so well has been attributed to various factors, 
including strong regulatory regime, stringent capital requirements for banks, federal supervision, a concentrated 
banking system, strict mortgage market regulations, and a conservative appetite for risk (Bordo et al., 2015; Calmes 
& Theoret, 2013; Mohsni & Otchere, 2018). Further, it is a common practice for Canadian banks to hold mortgage on 
their balance sheets, which results in the application of high level of due diligence in the underwriting of bank loans. 
As a result, Canada did not experience the same degree of housing boom and bust that occurred in many other countries 










diffuse into stock prices? (3) Does the impact of yield curve spreads on Canadian bank stock 
returns differ between the pre and post 2007-2009 financial crisis periods?  To explore these 
research questions we focus on the slope of the yield curve (aka yields spreads) since it is a well-
known measure (used by practitioners and academics) that allows us to corroborate the common 
belief that bank performance improves (i.e. increased cashflows due to higher net margins and 
banks’ positive maturity gap) with an upward-sloping yield curve rather than under a horizontal 
or downward-sloping yield curve. The reliance on the slope of the yield curve for this research 
seems appropriate given the nature of the Canadian banking system (i.e. their focus on domestic 
lending (including real estate mortgages), and an adherence to a traditional banking model of 
financial intermediation (i.e. reliance on asset and maturity transformation activities). Modern 
financial theory usually associates upward-sloping yield curves with rising interest rates and 
economic expansion; therefore, we anticipate a direct relationship between the slope of the yield 
curve and bank equity returns. The idea behind potential asymmetric impacts and lagged effects 
of yield curve spreads on bank stock returns, as framed in our second research question, is that 
investors respond differently to “good news” versus “bad news” and that stock prices take time 
to adjust to the arrival of new information.3 To investigate the impact of the of yield curve 
spreads on bank  equity returns in the pre and post (2007-2009) GFC periods, we include a crisis 
dummy variable in full-sample estimations while controlling for the slope of the yield curve. 
This allows to isolate the GFC effect on returns during an unprecedented low interest rate 
environment.    
Examining Canadian banks equity return behavior to changes in interest rates (changes in 
yield curve spreads) will provide evidence to policymakers, regulators, and practitioners globally 
                                                          
3 Refer to the methodology and results sections for discussion and citations on asymmetric impacts and the lagged 











to better understand how this particular banking structure (concentrated industry, strong 
regulatory regime, conservative risk profile, etc.) performs in the midst of interest pressure from 
domestic and global forces. Even with important changes in banking regulations and supervision 
introduced in response to (2007-2009) GFC, little has been done to incorporate “market signals” 
to gauge bank risk (Sarin and Summers, 2016). Over our sample period from 01/1997 to 8/2018, 
we cover two interesting periods of financial turmoil that were preceded by inverted yield curves 
associated with subsequent burst of the dot-com bubble in 2001 and the 2007-2009 GFC. Over 
the time frame of our research, yield curve spreads (measured as the difference between the 10-
year Treasury and the 3-month Treasury yields) reached a high of 3.781%, a low of -0.243% 
with an average spread of 0.932% (refer to Figure 2 for a visual of the yield curve spread 
pattern).  
 Using data from 01/1997 to 08/2018 and employing the Fama-French five-factor model 
supplemented with the yield curve factor, we find that changes in yield curve spreads, together 
with the Fama-French factors, explain the variation in Canadian bank-equity returns. Equity 
returns of Canadian banks tend to react in an asymmetric manner to changes in the slope of the 
yield curve (i.e. yield curve spreads above their mean values elicit a greater impact on bank 
equity returns than yield curve spreads that are below their mean values over our sample time 
horizon). Further, Canadian bank equity returns have become more sensitive to changes yield 
curve spreads in the post 2007-2009 Global recession period.   Lastly, the empirical evidence 
from this research suggests that the changes in the slope of the yield curve may gradually diffuse 
into banks’ equity returns. 
 These findings provide empirical evidence to supplement the conventional practitioner's 











particular, banks stocks due to their: 1) high leverage, 2) inherent interest rate risk to the 
financial intermediation process, and 3) market risk associated with trading activities. Further, 
our paper studies the equity returns of Canadian banks during a period of significant 
transformation in the banking system. While the Canadian banks performed much better than 
U.S. banks during the global 2007-2009 crisis period, we find no published research that sheds 
light on the influence of the yield curve on Canadian bank equity returns in either the pre- or 
post-crisis interest rate environment with the exception of the study by Allen et al. (2011).  
Finally, given the increased attention from central banks (including the Bank of Canada) on the 
potential implementation of a yield curve control (YCC) policy, this research provides a valuable 
up-to-date analysis of how yield curve spreads can influence equity returns.4 Given that the 
financial sector in Canada constitutes approximately 37% of the S&P/TSX composite index, it is 
also important for institutional and retail investors to recognize the validity of the slope of the 
yield curve as a factor that helps explain the variation in bank stock returns.5  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides a brief literature review, 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology, Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 
presents our conclusion and implications. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Impact of the yield curve on bank equity returns 
                                                          
4 On December 10, 2020, Paul Beaudry (Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada) stated that “Should things take a 
more persistent turn for the worse, we have a range of options at our disposal to provide additional monetary stimulus. 
This could include increasing the stimulus power of our QE program, or it could involve targeting specific points in 
the yield curve, otherwise known as yield-curve control.” See https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2020/12/our-quantitative-
easing-operations-looking-under-the-hood/   
5 For further details on the S&P/TSX Composite and S&P/TSX 60 indices please see 
https://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-tsx-composite-index and https://ca.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-tsx-
60-index. The “Big Six” Canadian banks include: the Bank of Montreal (BMO), Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS), 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), National Bank (NB), Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), and Toronto-
Dominion Bank (TD). These six banks make up approximately 90% of the assets under management in the Canadian 











 From an equity return perspective, Schuermann and Stiroh (2006) examine the common 
factors that drive the equity returns of U.S. bank holding companies from 1997 to 2005. They 
show that the market risk factor dominates in explaining bank returns followed by the Fama-
French factors (Fama and French, 1992, 1993). They also find that interest rate factors (i.e. one 
period change in the risk-free rate, the slope of the yield curve, and credit spreads) are not 
generally significant for large banks. However, the returns of small banks appear to be partially 
driven by the aforementioned interest rate factors.  Viale et al. (2009) find that the stock market 
excess return and shocks to the slope of the yield curve are statistically significant in explaining 
the cross-section of U.S. bank equity returns. Furthermore, they find no evidence that firm-
specific factors such as size and book-to-market ratios are priced in U.S. bank equity returns. 
Baek and Bilson (2015) empirically test the Fama and French three-factor model, with the 
inclusion of interest rate factors, on a large sample of U.S. non-financial and financial firms. 
They find that size and value risk premia commonly exist in both non-financial and financial 
firms, supporting Barber and Lyon (1997), and that an interest rate risk premium only appears in 
financial companies. Forming portfolios of U.S. money center, large, and regional commercial 
banks, Elyasiani and Mansur (1998) employ GARCH-M methodology to investigate the effect of 
the long-term interest rate (and its volatility) on monthly banks stock returns over the time period 
1970M1 to 1992M12. They find that the long-term interest rate has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on bank stock returns. Furthermore, interest rate volatility is found to be an 
important determinant of bank stock return volatility and bank stock risk premium for the money 
center and large bank portfolios. They find that the degree of persistence in shocks is substantial 











money center banks), and sensitive to portfolio characteristics and the prevalent monetary 
regime. 
2.2. Impact of the yield curve on bank profitability 
Theoretically, since bank’s earning assets (mainly loans and securities) usually tend to 
exhibit longer maturities than their funding sources (i.e. liabilities), it is reasonable to anticipate a 
positive relationship between an upward- sloping yield curve and profitability levels. To the 
degree that banks experience a positive maturity gap between the average maturities of their 
assets and the average maturities of their liabilities, revenues from longer-term assets should 
exceed expenses from shorter-term liabilities under an upward-sloping yield curve condition. 
Empirically, previous research has shed light on the impact of the yield curve on accounting-
based measures of profitability.  For example, Alessandri and Nelson (2015) compile a sample of 
44 U.K. bank groups over the period 1992Q1 to 2009Q3 and find that the level and slope of the 
yield curve contribute positively to profitability (net interest margins) in the long run. However, 
in the short run, they find that increases in market rates compress net interest margins. Further, 
they find that positive changes in the slope of the yield curve affect trading income in the 
opposite direction, consistent with banks hedging interest rate risk through derivatives.  Bolt et 
al. (2012) report a positive net yield curve effect on net interest margins based on individual 
bank yearly data for 19 countries from 1990-2007. Egly et al. (2018) find positive effects of the 
yield curve spreads on net interest margins that vary with bank size and change over time. 
Specifically, for their full sample comprised of more than 5,500 U.S. commercial banks, the 
change in net interest margins grows by 3.70%, given a 1% increase in the slope of the yield 











greater for small, medium, and all banks combined in their recovery period (2009Q3 to 2016Q4) 
estimations when compared to their initial period sample estimations (2001Q1 to 2009Q2).  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1.Data 
 This research uses monthly equity return data for Canadian publicly-traded banks from 
01/1997 to 08/2018 extracted from Datastream. Due to the concentrated nature of the Canadian 
banking system, the eleven banks included in our study consist of all publicly-traded Schedule 1 
banks in Canada listed in the S&P/TSX composite index.6 Appendix A contains a list of the 
banks employed in the study. Using the complete set of publicly-traded banks also adds to the 
uniqueness and contribution of this paper, as most of the previous work on the Canadian banking 
sector has focused on the ‘Big 6’ banks (e.g., Guidara et al., (2013); Calmes and Theoret (2014); 
Mohsni and Otchere (2018)). The data for the Canadian yield curve (3-month Treasury Bill rate, 
2-year, and 10-year Treasury Bond rate) was obtained via Statistics Canada: 
https://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/start (table 10-10-0122-01). Figure 1 provides a visual of the 
interest rate environment in Canada over the sample period. Figure 2 indicates that Canada 
experienced an inverted yield curve during the year 2000, which was followed by sharp declines 
in short-term interest rates. Canada, like other developed economies, experienced a second 
prolong inverted yield curve that began in mid-year 2004 and ended in late 2006. Since then, 
long-term rates have been on the decline with gradual increases noted in recent times, while 
short-term rates declined to historically low levels.  Finally, Fama-French (1993, 2015) factors 
                                                          
6 Banks in Canada are distinguished with regard to whether they are domestic-owned (Schedule 1), foreign subsidiaries 
operating in Canada (Schedule 2), or foreign bank branches operating in Canada (Schedule 3). For further information 











for North America are obtained via the Kenneth French’s website.7 Table 1 provides the 
summary statistics for the variables included in this study.  
The Fama-French variables used in our study do exhibit moderate correlation.  As Fama 
and French (2017) highlight, high book-to-market (B/M) value stocks tend to have low 
profitability and investment levels, and low B/M growth stocks, especially large low B/M stocks, 
tend to be profitable and invest aggressively. Specifically, the market (MRK) factor has 
correlations that range from 0.2311 (with small minus big (SMB) to -0.3784 (with conservative 
minus aggressive CMA)). The highest degree of correlation amongst the Fama-French factors is 
related to the high minus low (HML) factor. Its degree of correlation is highest with CMA 
(0.5978). The overall correlation results show that the market, size, value, profitability, and 
investment factors (MRK, SMB, HML, robust minus weak (RMW), and CMA) have interesting 
co-movement patterns which motivates us to examine equity returns. Finally, the yield curve 
exhibits fairly low correlations with the Fama-French factors. The highest degree of correlation 
that the yield curve has is with the SMB factor (0.1931) and with the market factor (MRK) the 
correlation is only 0.0416.8  
3.2.Methodology and the Models 
 Given the cross-section and time-series dimensions of the bank sample data set, panel 
estimation techniques are employed to examine the impact of the yield curve on Canadian bank 
stock returns over the period January 1997 through August 2018.   Our asset pricing model is 
                                                          
7 This paper uses the North American Fama-French factors from Kenneth French website since specific factors for 
Canada are not available through their website. See 
https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. In the robustness section of this paper, 
we replace the North American Fama- French factors with Canadian specific factors that were downloaded from the 
Applied Quantitative Research (AQR) Capital Management LLC (https://www.aqr.com/Insights/Datasets/Betting-
Against-Beta-Equity-Factors-Monthly). 
8 For brevity, in the narrative we highlight important correlation coefficients which are not presented in Table form. 
Correlations tables are available from the authors upon request. As reported in the text, correlation coefficients are 











based on the Fama- French (2015) five-factor model and incorporates alternative measures of the 
slope the yield curve (YC) under separate specifications.  The use of the Fama-French factor 
model is motivated by its underpinning to the dividend discount model and prior empirical 
evidence that suggests that profitability and investment help capture additional variation in 
average returns. Our sample of Canadian banks exhibit significant profitability and dividend 
payment history during our sample period.  
Our focus on the impact of the slope of the yield on bank equity returns allows us to 
validate the common belief that banks tend to fare better (i.e. improved cashflows due to higher 
net margins and banks’ positive maturity gap) with an upward-sloping yield curve than under a 
horizontal or downward-sloping yield curve. Furthermore, since modern financial theory usually 
associates upward-sloping yield curves with rising interest rates and economic expansion, we 
anticipate a direct relationship between the slope of the yield curve and bank equity returns. To 
the extent that our bank sample consist of large and (valued-based) firms, we anticipate an 
inverse (direct) relationship between the size and (value) risk factors per the Fama- French multi-
factor model and bank equity returns. Value firms commonly exhibit high Book-to-Market (B/M) 
levels. Drawing from Fama and French (2017) who find that high (B/M) value firms tend to 
exhibit low profitability and investment levels, we anticipate an inverse relationship between the 
profitability and investment risk factors per the Fama- French multi-factor model and bank 
equity returns.  
The model is estimated using fixed effects which assumes that differences across units 
(banks in our case) are captured by the time- invariant (bank-specific) constant intercept terms. 











unobserved variables) is correlated with 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 (the regressors in our model)
9. It is plausible that 
bank-specific unobserved factors such as managerial ability, credit cultural, investment 
strategies, market share objectives, etc., which arguably impact bank stock returns, may also be 
correlated with the Fama-French model risk-factors. For example, 1) a conceivable   relationship 
between bank-specific market share objectives and the size risk factor (SMB), and 2) a likely 
connection between bank-specific investment strategies and the valuation risk factor (HML).  To 
validate this empirical approach, a series of diagnostic tests are applied. First, F test results from 
the fixed effects model determine whether there are differences across banks.  Second, we 
employ Hausman tests to determine whether fixed or random effects are the appropriate 
specification. The Hausman test statistic is Chi-square distributed; the null hypothesis is that 
coefficients estimated by random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the 
fixed effects estimator.  This panel estimation approach differentiates our research from the 
previous work by Barber and Lyon (1997), Viale et al. (2009), and Baek and Bilson (2015), who 
apply a pooled approach or form bank portfolios on the basis of size and value risk factors. Our 
modeling approach allows us to capture bank-level heterogeneity and minimize any potential 
bias that may result from the aggregation of banks into broader aggregates.10 
 To investigate the impact of shifts in the yield curve on bank equity returns, we expand 
the Fama-French (2015) five-factor model to include alternative measures of the yield curve 
(YC) under separate specifications. Our benchmark model is expressed as follows:  
                                                          
9  If 𝑧𝑖  is unobserved yet correlated with 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 the least squares estimator of  𝛽 is biased and inconsistent due to an omitted 
variable. However, in the instance where the model is  𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 and 𝛼𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖
′𝛼  embodies all observable effects, an 
estimable conditional mean equation can be specified. See Greene (2003). 
10 Our estimation results and robust standard errors use the Huber-White sandwich estimator method. Such robust 
standard errors can deal with concerns about the failure to meet ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions as to the 
behavior of the error term. For example, problems about normality of the error-term distribution, heteroscedasticity    
(non-constant variance of the error term conditioned on explanatory variable levels) ,or observations that exhibit large 












𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +  +𝛽4 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑌𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡is the excess monthly return on bank stock i, (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the excess monthly 
return on the market portfolio, SMBt is the difference in monthly returns between a small-cap 
portfolio and a large-cap portfolio, HMLt is the difference in monthly returns between a portfolio 
of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks, RMWt is the difference in 
monthly returns between a portfolio of robust profitability stocks and one of weak profitability 
stocks, and CMAt is the difference in monthly returns between a portfolio of conservative 
investment stocks and one of aggressive investment stocks. YC is one of the following measures: 
1) The slope of the yield curve, measured as the difference between the 10-year Treasury Bond 
rate and 3-month Treasury Bill rate or 2) The slope of the yield curve, measured as the difference 
between the 10-year and 2-year Treasury Bond rates.  
 Secondly, to test for the potential of significant asymmetric effects of the yield curve on 
bank equity returns, we expand our benchmark model to include (and adapt) the threshold model 
specifications similar to Baur and Todorova (2018) as follows:   
𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 +
                          𝛽6 𝑌𝐶𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝑌𝐶𝑡𝐷𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                 (2) 
 where the dummy variable Dt is equal to one if the yield curve is above a certain 
threshold (mean of the YC series over the full sample period) and zero otherwise. Model (2) 
statistically tests for asymmetry based on the coefficient 𝛽7. 
To improve our understanding of asymmetric impacts of the yield curve on bank equity 
returns, we separate the yield curve series into two parts, one which includes only yield curve 
increases, 𝑌𝐶+ , and another including only yield curve decreases, 𝑌𝐶−. This alternative model 











betas have different signs which may lead to lower and insignificant average yield curve betas 
and thus potentially misleading conclusions. The idea of this specification is to determine 
whether investors (and or other relevant economic agents) respond differently to positive and 
negative movements in the slope of the yield curve. This alternative model specification is 
written as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  +  𝛽4 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 +
                    𝛽6 𝑌𝐶
+
𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝑌𝐶
−
𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                    (3) 
Finally, we check for a possible lagged effect of changes in the slope of the yield curve 
on bank stock returns. This lagged impact hypothesis is motivated by a number of empirical 
studies (e.g., Bolt et al., 2012) and supported by the under-reaction theory (Daniel et al. 1998), 
and the gradual information diffusion hypothesis (Hong and Stein, 1999 and Hong et al., 2007). 
To test for the lagged impact of changes in the slope of the yield curve on bank equity returns, 
we replace the contemporaneous yield curve term with its one-month lag in our model as 
follows:  




4.1. Fama-French Five-Factor and Yield Curve Impact  
Table 2 provides the results for our benchmark model (equation 1) under two 
specifications over the full sample period (1/1997 to 08/2018). The first specification includes a 
yield curve spread between the 10-year Canadian Treasury Bond rate and the 3-month Canadian 
Treasury Bill (YC 10Y- 3M) while the second specification use the yield curve spread between 
the 10-year and 2-year Canadian Treasury Bond rates (10Y- 2Y). Canadian banks reflect positive 











The relatively low market beta aligns with the common view from practitioners and academics 
that Canadian banks are less risky and better capitalized compared to the U.S. and other foreign 
banks. For example, Schuermann and Stiroh (2006) find that the market beta coefficients for 
large banks in the U.S. market range from 1.0546 to 1.2520.  It should be noted that the reported 
market beta coefficients in Schuermann and Stiroh’s (2006) study are for the sample period from 
1997 to 2005 and thus may not be directly comparable to our results. Nonetheless, we are able to 
gain some perspective   of market betas for North American banks. Schuermann and Stiroh 
(2006) also show that the market risk factor is the dominant variable in explaining the variation 
in bank stock returns followed by the Fama-French factors (SMB and HML). 
 Gandhi and Lustig (2015) find the market beta increases monotonically with bank size 
for their sample of U.S. banks over 1970 to 2013. Their portfolio of large banks has a market 
beta of 1.22 compared to a market beta of 0.46 for a portfolio of the smallest banks; the results 
suggest that large banks were significantly more exposed to market risk as compared to small 
banks. The authors attribute this large difference primarily to differences in leverage. Guidara et 
al. (2013) find that Canadian banks are well-capitalized based on their capital and leverage 
capital buffers of 5.09% and 0.49% respectively, which exceed the minimum regulatory 
requirements. These findings provide a possible explanation for Canadian banks’ lower market 
beta risk and their ability to prevail during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
A review of the (SMB and HML) factors suggests that only the value factor (HML) helps 
to explain the variation in Canadian bank equity returns based on the positive and statistically 
significant coefficients on the HML variable. Gandhi and Lustig (2015) find that for their sample 
of U.S. banks, SMB factor coefficients are close to 0.40 on the 1st 9 market-cap sized portfolios 











portfolio.   The positive (and significant) coefficients on the HML variable in our estimations are 
in line with those reported by Gandhi and Lustig (2015); in their study, loadings on HML 
variable range from 0.50 for their smallest portfolio to 0.70 for their largest portfolio.  
The profitability (robust vs. weak) and investment style (i.e., conservative vs. aggressive) 
factors (RMW and CMA, respectively) have an unfavorable impact on bank equity returns given 
the negative (and statically significant) coefficients reported on these two risk factors. The results 
related to investment style (our CMA variable) supports the findings of Titman, et al. (2013), 
who show that high investment is followed by low average returns in many equity markets. 
Further, Fama and French (2017) also reported a negative coefficient for the investment factor. 
The negative coefficients related to profitability (our RMW variable) align with the results from 
Jareño et al. (2018) but are in contrast with the Fama and French (2017) results. The conflicting 
results could be attributed to sample-specific characteristics and support the conjecture that 
Fama-French (2015) five-factor models most likely are sensitive to country-specific and industry 
samples. The results of this study suggest that high levels of profitability generated by the 
Canadian banking sector lead to lower returns. While our results seem counterintuitive given that 
higher expected earnings usually translated to higher expected returns, ceteris-paribus, Fama and 
French (2015) report that holding operating profitably roughly constant, average equity returns 
typically diminishes as firm size increases.  
The key variable of interest in this study (the two yield curve measures) generates a 
positive impact on bank equity returns as reflected in the statistically significant coefficients of 
0.0028 and 0.0024 on the YC (10Y-3M) and the YC (10Y-2Y) yield curve variables, 











increased net interest income from the interest-rates carry trade11, which involves borrowing 
shorter-term funds at lower interest rates and investing these funds in longer-term loans and 
securities at higher interest rates. The positive yield curve spreads impact on bank performance 
implies that investors expect improved earnings (and potentially a strengthened dividend stream) 
that should translate to increased expected returns. Banks profitability should be positively 
related to short-term interest rates as banks raise their loan rates and shrink their lending 
quantities in response to higher funding costs; however, the short-run and long-run effects can be 
different. If banks borrow short and lend long, and if their interest rates are not fully flexible in 
the short run, banks will be exposed to repricing and yield curve risk. Our study shows that the 
yield curve is a factor in explaining bank equity returns, after controlling for market risk and 
additional Fama-French risk factors.  
4.2.  Asymmetric Impacts 
 Table 3 provides the results of Models 2 and 3, which test for asymmetric impacts of the 
yield curve on bank equity returns. The Fama-French factors remain stable and consistent 
throughout these estimations based on the reported coefficients. In columns (1) and (2), the 
coefficients on the dummy variables (YC(10Y-3M)*YC(D) and YC(10Y-2Y)*YC(D)) suggest 
that there is an asymmetric impact of the yield curve spread on bank equity returns. Specifically, 
during times when the yield curve spread is above its mean over the full sample period (steep 
upward sloping yield curve), the influence it has on bank equity returns is positive with 
                                                          
11 Typical “interest rate carry trade” activities by commercial banks takes place when costs (tied to interest rates) 
from funding sources (usually consisting of short-term claims: liabilities) are lower than revenues (linked to interest 
rates) from longer-term earning assets (i.e. loans and securities). Banks earning assets usually tend to exhibit longer 
maturities than their funding sources. This interest rate carry trade strategy should be profitable for banks with a 
positive maturity GAP between their average maturity of assets and their average maturity of their liabilities and 











statistically significant coefficients (albeit small in magnitude) of 0.0045 and 0.0060, 
respectively. 
Galbraith and Tkacz (2000) find evidence of an asymmetric impact of the yield spread on 
output, particularly in Canada and the U.S.  If we accept that the yield spread captures the 
direction  
of monetary policy to some degree, then YC spreads above the mean threshold could be 
associated with strong expansionary monetary episodes that may translate into positive sentiment 
and investor activity in financial equities. The coefficients for the yield curve factors (YC (10Y-
3M) & YC (10Y-2Y)) are both negative. The statistically significant coefficient on the YC (10Y- 
2Y) variable is almost three times greater than the coefficient on the YC (10Y-3M) variable 
which was statistically insignificant. This may imply that banks (and their stock prices) are more 
sensitive to the (10Y-2Y) yield curve spread as opposed to the (10Y-3M) spread.  The negative 
impact of interest rate changes may suggest the presence of short-run repricing frictions, as 
suggested by Alessandri and Nelson (2015). Unexpected increases in rates can initially compress 
banks' margins, and only in the long term does it become possible that higher interest rates 
contribute to higher profitability, and thus equity prices.  
The results of the alternative model (columns (3) and (4) of Table 3) also support an 
asymmetric impact of the yield curve spread on bank equity returns. A negative yield curve 
spread series (i.e. negative YC movements measured by YC(10Y-3M)-) and YC(10Y-2Y)- 
variables)  elicit  a negative response in bank equity returns. Consistent with our expectations, 
positive changes in the yield curve spread measured through the YC(10Y-3M)+ and YC(10Y-
2Y)+ variables elicit a positive effect on bank equity returns. These results are an important 











is influenced by the slope of the yield curve. One plausible explanation for the increased 
response/reaction by banks and investors to yield curve shifts might relate to the increased 
coverage given by the financial press on this economic indicator. Although the increase in the R2 
is marginal, the asymmetric impacts reported in Table 3 highlight the importance of enhanced 
bank-applied risk-control management particularly during periods of unconventional yield curve 
environments. 
4.3. Pre- and Post-Crisis Results  
 Tables 4 and 5 provide the results for Model 1, for the initial (pre-financial crisis) sub-
sample period (1997M01 to 2007M12) and the final post-financial crisis sub-sample period 
(2009M1 to 2018M8), respectively. Following the global financial crisis, there has been an 
unconventional monetary policy that led short-term interest rates to approach the “zero-lower-
bound”. This historical low-interest rate setting provides an opportunity to revisit bank behavior 
(and by extension bank equity returns) under this new economic environment. The Fama-French 
factors (except for the RMW factor in the post-financial crisis period) remain relatively stable 
and robust across the estimations in both sub-sample periods. There is a modest decline in the 
market risk (MRK) coefficients between the pre-and- post-crisis periods (i.e. pre-crisis 
coefficients of 0.7526 and 0.7537 vs. post-crisis coefficients of 0.6212 and 0.6252).  This finding 
indicates that the sensitivity of banking stocks to market risk has diminished over time. This 
decline in bank market betas is explained by the lower covariance of bank stock returns with 
market returns for the period after the financial crisis and aligns with the findings of King (2009) 
who document a decline in the market risk factor for a sample of banks from Canada, France, 











The impact of the yield curve spreads on bank equity returns becomes relevant only in 
the post-crisis period. The coefficients on the yield curve variables in the post-crisis period are 
positive (yet small in magnitude reported at 0.0057 and 0.0068, respectively) and statistically 
significant. The small magnitude of the yield curve coefficients aligns with previous literature 
that suggests that the increased availability of advanced tools for measuring and managing 
interest rate risk, reduces banks stock returns sensitivity to changes in interest rates (e.g., Ryan 
and Worthington, 2004; Joseph and Vezos, 2006). This empirical evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that interactions between financial institutions and monetary authorities tend to 
increase in times of (and continues after) financial turbulence due to the existence of significant 
contagion effects. The positive and statistically significant coefficients on the yield curve 
variables in the period after the global financial crisis suggests that changes in the yield curve 
spread and equity price movements have strengthened over the past decade.  
At an initial glance, this stronger co-movement may be driven by economic prospects and 
the flight-to-quality wave from high-risk stocks towards low-risk stocks and government bonds 
with more solid economic fundamentals. A closer look at our data shows that yield curve spreads 
were indeed higher in the post-financial crisis period compared to the pre-financial crisis period 
which helps to explain our findings; higher spreads potentially lead to higher net profit margins 
(and improved cash flows), which would favorably impact bank-equity prices12.  To untangle the 
potential effects of the slope of the yield curve on bank equity returns in the aftermath of the 
GFC and a historically low-interest rate time period, we incorporate (under alternative 
estimations) a crisis dummy variable in our full-sample regressions while controlling for the 
slope of the yield curve.  We find that the GFC dummy variable is statistically insignificant when 
                                                          












incorporated into model (1) using both the 10Y-3M and 10Y-2Y measures of the slope of the 
yield curve. This is plausible since, as previously mentioned, the Canadian banking system 
remained strong and stable during the GFC and did not require any form of a bailout.13  This 
evidence provides academics and practitioners with updated information on how the impact of 
the yield curve may change over time.  
4.4. Gradual Information Diffusion (Lagged Impact) 
The regression results from Model 4 reported in Table 6, which tests the gradual 
information diffusion hypothesis, suggest that the impact of the slope of the yield curve on 
banks’ equity returns in Canada diffuses over time based on the statistically significant 
coefficients on lagged yield curve spreads.  If market participants react gradually to the arrival of 
new information, Siegel (1998) suggests that a reliable predictor of turning points in the business 
cycle (e.g. the yield curve) would also serve as a useful tool for equity investors.  The 
statistically significant coefficients for the lag of the (10Y-3M) and (10Y-2Y) variables are 
0.0035 and 0.0026, respectively.   Since the Bank of Canada (or other central banks) can exert 
considerable influence on the slope of the yield curve by setting short-term rates at levels that 
encourage liquidity building by commercial banks, this finding has important monetary policy 
implications.  Monetary policy actions focused on keeping inflation within pre-defined target 
thresholds may have the unintended consequence of influencing the likely direction of future 
bank equity returns. It is an open question whether such policy-induced trends (and their 
eventual reversal due to exogenous economic shocks and/or changes in the course of monetary 
                                                          
13 Please note that we also included a dummy variable to capture the volatile nature of the financial markets during 
the “dot.com bubble” correction in 2001. The coefficients for the “dot.com” dummy were also insignificant. In the 
regression controlling for both the “dot.com” and the GFC periods, the coefficients for the 10Y-3M and 10Y-2Y 
variables remain fairly stable (albeit small in magnitude) and statistically significant at 0.0027 and 0.0022, 











policy) can have detrimental side effects on the stability of the financial sector or the economy as 
a whole. Central bankers may find themselves facing a dilemma between the goals of 
maintaining a stable price level, and avoiding any unfavorable interference with the price 
formation processes on equity markets. 
The Fama-French factors, along with the aforementioned yield curve factors, are 
consistent with the specification identified as Model 1 that incorporates a contemporaneous yield 
curve variable. This finding implies that momentum traders can benefit if they know where 
Canadian banks and investors are in their information diffusion cycle. Momentum traders can 
enter into Canadian bank stocks approximately one month after a positive change in the yield 
curve spread and potentially generate greater risk-adjusted returns.     
4.5. Further Analysis and Robustness 
We conducted several robustness tests. First, we ran our benchmark model, based on 
North-American Fama-French factors (aka “North American Factors”), using the more 
parsimonious Fama-French three-factor model and including our yield curve spreads (i.e. YC 
(10Y-3M) and YC (10Y-2Y)) under separate specifications- (refer to Columns 1 and 2 of Table 
7). The direction and statistical significance of regressor coefficients (inclusive of the yield 
spread variables) align well with the results from our benchmark model.  Second, to test the 
robustness of the results, we rerun the specifications reported in Columns 1 and 2 with the 
Canadian-specific factors aka “Canadian Factors” (MRK, SMB, and HML) downloaded from 
AQR website. The MRK factor remains relatively consistent (coefficients 0.7532 and 0.7544) 
based on North American Factors compared to coefficients of 0.5659 and 0.5686, respectively, 
using the Canadian Factors. The HML factor remains positive and statistically significant when 











spreads on bank stock returns holds under both data sets (i.e. North American and Canadian 
Factors).   The only important difference in results surrounds the SMB risk factor when 
employing these distinct data sets.  The SMB factor has no impact on bank stock returns given 
the statistically insignificant coefficients when using the North American Factors downloaded 
from the Kenneth French website (see Columns 1 and 2). However, the SMB factor has a 
negative impact on bank stock returns (statistically significant coefficients of -0.2717 and 
0.2707, accordingly) based on the Canadian Factors. 
This difference in the findings with respect to the SMB factor impact on bank stock 
returns is likely due to discernible difference in the composition of the data sets (i.e. North 
American Factors would seem to encompass a broader scope compared to the Canadian-specific 
Factors available through the AQR website). As Griffin (2002) highlighted, no asset pricing 
model can completely explain the variation in asset performance. The findings using the 
Canadian Factors lend some support to the findings of Griffin (2002) and Fama and French 
(2012) that suggest country-specific versions of asset pricing models may yield more useful 
metrics when trying to explain the time-series variation in portfolio and individual stock returns. 
Third, to capture lagged effects of positive and negative movements in the slope of the yield 
curve on bank stock returns, we ran specifications based on Model 3, which is defined in our 
“Data and Methodology” section, replacing concurrent yield curve spreads with their one-month 
lags. With the exception of the lagged positive (L.YC (10Y-3M) + ) yield curve spread series, 
lagged effects seem insignificant. Of note, concurrent positive and negative yield curve spread 
series were statistically significant in the original specifications (refer to Table 3 Columns 3 and 











Fourth, additional estimations were performed on our expanded benchmark model 
(Model 2) that incorporates the asymmetric impact of yield curve slope effects on bank stock 
returns employing alternative thresholds in place of the mean value of the yield curve series (e.g., 
median, moving averages, 75th percentile, etc.). The results were not significantly altered and the 
alternative estimations are available from the authors upon request. Fifth, we explored two other 
subsample periods (i.e. (1997-2006) and (2010-2018) to test the robustness of our results using 
our benchmark Model 1. These sample-period time windows allow us to further insulate the pre 
and post 2007-2009 financial crisis periods. We chose to exclude the calendar year 2008 in our 
sub-sample estimations to limit the largest noise component of the financial crisis that spawned 
major volatility swings in the equity markets. Our general conclusion remains unchanged in that 
there is no impact of the yield curve spreads on stock returns in the pre-crisis period, and a 
positive (and statistically significant) impact in the post-crisis period. These subsample 
estimations are available from the authors upon request. 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
Given that the Canadian banking system has been one of the most stable and successful 
in the world over the past several decades and was one of only a few that did not require a 
‘bailout’ during the period of the 2007-2009 GFC, it is meaningful to explore how changes in 
yield curve spreads affect Canadian banks’ equity returns. Examining how the Canadian banking 
system responds to macroeconomic shocks, particularly in the era of historically low interest 
rates, is an important contribution to the academic literature on banks reaction to interest rates 
movements since most of the published research focuses on the U.S and Europe banking 
systems. We expand scant research that employs the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model 











test for asymmetric and lagged impacts of changes in yield curve spreads on Canadian bank-
equity returns. Furthermore, by applying a panel regression modeling approach, we depart from 
the portfolio method commonly used in asset pricing modeling to explain equity return 
variability. Our modeling approach allows us to account for the potential bank-level 
heterogeneity that may exist within our bank sample. 
Our results suggest that changes in the slope of the yield curve, together with the Fama-
French factors, explain the variation in Canadian bank-equity returns. Equity returns of Canadian 
banks tend to react in an asymmetric manner to changes in the slope of the yield curve (i.e., yield 
curve spreads above their mean values elicit a greater impact on bank equity returns than yield 
curve spreads that are below their mean values over our sample time horizon). Our findings 
complement anecdotal evidence covered by the financial press that ordinarily reports a 
connection between bank profitability (and by extension, bank stock performance) to yield curve 
conditions. Evaluating the yield curve spread regression coefficients at the mean yield curve 
spread values during the recovery period for our sample of Canadian banks leads (on average) to 
a 3.9115% increase in the monthly excess bank equity returns. Canadian bank equity returns 
have become more sensitive to changes in the yield curve spread in the post 2007-2009 Global 
recession period.   Lastly, the empirical evidence from this research suggests that the changes in 
yield curve spreads may gradually diffuse into banks’ equity returns.  
Our findings suggest that portfolio managers need to be aware of the sensitivity of bank 
equity returns to changes in the yield curve. Regulators must be cognizant of banks’ potential 
shifts in profit-seeking behavior (e.g., increasing fee-based revenue sources) over a time that 
could be tied to swings in the yield curve. Bank equity valuations may be negatively impacted in 











periods of unfavorable yield curve shifts. When this happens, banks are pressured to retain 
profits and payout fewer dividends, especially when capital buffers fall below required levels. 
Our findings have important implications for the estimation of banks' cost of capital and 
implicitly suggest regulatory initiatives in favor of macro-prudential policy to evaluate bank risk.  
Admittedly, there are many potential risk factors that might help to explain the behavior 
of bank stocks (e.g. liquidity, foreign exchange, credit, market, etc.). An asset pricing model that 
completely captures average returns does not, and most likely, will never exist. What this study 
highlights is that for bank stocks, country-specific versions of the traditional factor models using 
country or regional factors can potentially yield marginal differences in the results. As Griffin 
(2002) suggested, cost-of capital, performance measurement, and risk analysis using Fama-
French-style models may be best done on a within-country basis. Further research may focus on 
the following: 1) expanding the understanding of which global and regional factors are useful in 
obtaining factor-based asset model estimates (e.g. McCown, 2001) and Fama and French, 2012), 
2) extending this study (that captures asymmetric,  current, and lagged impacts of the slope of the 
yield curve on bank equity returns) by incorporating the level and curvature of the term structure 
of interest rates, and 3) exploring and presenting up-to-date evidence on the evolution of  market 
risk factors that are used when evaluating bank stock returns.  
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Figure 1: Canadian Interest Rates 
Note: Crisis periods represent the “Dot.com” bubble correction in 2001 and the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis 




Figure 2: Canadian Yield Curves Spreads 
Note: Crisis periods represent the “Dot.com” bubble correction in 2001 and the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis 



















Table 1: Summary Descriptive Statistics Model Variables 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
RET 2,564 0.0025 0.0768 -0.3266 0.1930 
MRK 260 0.0065 0.0436 -0.1841 0.1156 
SMB 260 0.0015 0.0280 -0.1385 0.1668 
HML 260 0.0013 0.0341 -0.1401 0.1728 
RMW 260 0.0036 0.0258 -0.1536 0.1395 
CMA 260 0.0023 0.0275 -0.1071 0.1458 
YC (10Y-3M) 260 1.4121 0.9323 -0.2432 3.7809 
YC (10Y-2Y) 260 0.9650 0.6261 -0.1901 2.3010 
Note: RET is the monthly equity returns of Canadian publicly traded banks excluding dividends.  MRK, SMB, 
HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. Where MRK is the excess 
monthly return on TSX Composite index over the risk-free rate (3-month Canadian treasury bill), SMBt is the 
difference in monthly returns between a small-cap portfolio and a large-cap portfolio, and HMLt is the difference in 
monthly returns between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks. The 
original Fama and French (1997) 3-factor model (includes MRK, SMB, and HML) was extended by Fama and 
French (2015) to include an additional two factors; one to account for profitability (RMW) and one to account for 
aggressive investment stocks (CMA).  YC (10Y-3M) is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-
month Treasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year Treasury 











Table 2: Fixed Effects Panel Models. Dependent Variable: excess bank-stock returns, full sample 
period 1997M1-2018M8 
  (1) (2) 
MRK 0.6656*** 0.6679*** 
 (0.0588) (0.0588) 
SMB -0.0276 -0.0189 
 (0.0964) (0.0949) 
HML 0.5929*** 0.5917*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0356) 
RMW -0.2782*** -0.2735*** 
 (0.0666) (0.0673) 
CMA -0.2756*** -0.2738*** 
 (0.0631) (0.0636) 
YC (10Y-3M) 0.0028***  
 (0.0009)  
YC (10Y - 2Y)  0.0024** 
  (0.0010) 
   
Constant -0.0047*** -0.0032** 
 (0.0014) (0.0011) 
   
Observations 2,564 2,564 
R-squared 0.1955 0.1948 
# of Banks 11 11 
Note: MRK, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. YC (10Y-3M) 
is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-month Treasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference 
between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year Treasury yield. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The 























Table 3: Fixed Effects Panel Models with asymmetric yield curve spread impacts. Dependent 
Variable: excess bank-stock returns, full sample period 1997M1-2018M8 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MRK 0.6648*** 0.6614*** 0.6689*** 0.6769*** 
 (0.0589) (0.0586) (0.0585) (0.0543) 
SMB -0.0285 -0.0339 0.0008 -0.0170 
 (0.0964) (0.0967) (0.0914) (0.0947) 
HML 0.5883*** 0.5935*** 0.5913*** 0.5936*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0357) (0.0384) (0.0354) 
RMW -0.2885*** -0.2944*** -0.2826*** -0.2497*** 
 (0.0652) (0.0641) (0.0592) (0.0676) 
CMA -0.2790*** -0.2901*** -0.2663*** -0.2850*** 
 (0.0628) (0.0621) (0.0617) (0.0623) 
YC (10Y-3M) -0.0028    
 (0.0019)    
YC (10Y-3M)*YC(D) 0.0045**    
 (0.0015)    
YC (10Y-2Y)  -0.0076**   
  (0.0029)   
YC (10Y-2Y)*YC(D)  0.0060***   
  (0.0017)   
YC (10Y-3M) +   -0.0022  
   (0.0117)  
YC (10Y-3M) -   -0.0224**  
   (0.0098)  
YC (10Y-2Y) +    0.0273** 
    (0.0108) 
YC (10Y-2Y) -    -0.0390*** 
 
   (0.0116) 
Constant -0.0012 0.0010 -0.0028* -0.0049*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
     
Observations 2,564 2,564 2,564 2,564 
R-squared 0.1962 0.1970 0.1961 0.1971 
# of Banks 11 11 11 11 
Note: MRK, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. YC (10Y-3M) 
is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-monthTreasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference 
between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year Treasury yield. YC(D) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
level of the yield curve is above its mean and zero otherwise.  + indicates a series of the yield curve based solely on 
positive movements and – indicates a series of the yield curve based solely on negative movements. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 















Table 4: Fixed Effects Panel Models. Dependent Variable: excess bank-stock returns, sub-
sample period 1997M1-2007M12 
  (1) (2) 
MRK 0.7526*** 0.7537*** 
 (0.0737) (0.0735) 
SMB 0.0693 0.0732 
 (0.1203) (0.1205) 
HML 0.5597*** 0.5584*** 
 (0.0830) (0.0827) 
RMW -0.2281** -0.2258** 
 (0.0967) (0.0969) 
CMA -0.1679** -0.1668** 
 (0.0697) (0.0707) 
YC (10Y-3M) 0.0015  
 (0.0013)  
YC (10Y-2Y)  0.0012 
  (0.0017) 
Constant -0.0047** -0.0038** 
 (0.0018) (0.0016) 
   
Observations 1,224 1,224 
R-squared 0.1586 0.1583 
# of Banks 10 10 
Note: MRK, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. YC (10Y-3M) 
is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-month Treasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference 
between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year Treasury yield. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The 






















Table 5: Fixed Effects Panel Models. Dependent Variable: excess bank-stock returns, sub-
sample period 2009M1- 2018M8. 
  (1) (2) 
MRK 0.6212*** 0.6252*** 
 (0.0677) (0.0678) 
SMB -0.0992 -0.0752 
 (0.0712) (0.0686) 
HML 0.6469*** 0.6483*** 
 (0.1102) (0.1111) 
RMW -0.2136 -0.1931 
 (0.1586) (0.1631) 
CMA -0.5243** -0.5314** 
 (0.1757) (0.1798) 
YC (10Y-3M) 0.0057***  
 (0.0013)  
YC (10Y-2Y)  0.0068*** 
  (0.0017) 
Constant -0.0072*** -0.0063*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0016) 
   
Observations 1,220 1,220 
R-squared 0.2290 0.2273 
# of Banks 11 11 
Note: MRK, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. YC (10Y-3M) 
is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-monthTreasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference 
between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year Treasury yield. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The 























Table 6: Fixed Effects Panel Models with lagged yield curve spread impacts. Dependent 
Variable: excess bank-stock returns, full sample period 1997M1-2018M8 
  (1) (2) 
MRK 0.6643*** 0.6656*** 
 (0.0587) (0.0588) 
SMB -0.0288 -0.0202 
 (0.0967) (0.0955) 
HML 0.5933*** 0.5923*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0355) 
RMW -0.2858*** -0.2771*** 
 (0.0652) (0.0669) 
CMA -0.2731*** -0.2732*** 
 (0.0634) (0.0637) 
L.YC (10Y-3M) 0.0035**  
 (0.0011)  
L.YC (10Y-2Y)  0.0026** 
  (0.0011) 
Constant -0.0057*** -0.0033** 
 (0.0018) (0.0012) 
   
Observations 2,564 2,564 
R-squared 0.1961 0.1948 
# of Banks 11 11 
Note: MRK, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. YC (10Y-3M) 
is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-month Treasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference 
between the 10Y yield Treasury and the 2Y Treasury yield. The YC variables enter the models with a one-month 
lag. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of statistical significance of 





















Table 7: Fixed Effects Panel Models- robustness checks with Fama-French 3-factor model, AQR 
data & lagged (+) and (-) changes of YC spreads. Dependent Variable: excess bank-stock returns, 
full sample period 1997M1-2018M8 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MRK 0.7532*** 0.7544*** 0.5659*** 0.5686*** 0.6684*** 0.6685*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0564) (0.0345) (0.0343) (0.0600) (0.0591) 
SMB 0.0589 0.0650 -0.2717*** -0.2707*** -0.0084 0.0025 
 (0.0956) (0.0941) (0.0798) (0.0793) (0.0958) (0.0937) 
HML 0.3500*** 0.3510*** 0.0976*** 0.0976*** 0.5884*** 0.5854*** 
 (0.0524) (0.0527) (0.0258) (0.0257) (0.0374) (0.0351) 
RMW      -0.2508*** -0.2496*** 
     (0.0667) (0.0684) 
CMA     -0.2911*** -0.2939*** 
     (0.0597) (0.0630) 
YC (10Y-3M) 0.0025**  0.0034***    
 (0.0009)  (0.0009)    
YC (10Y-2Y)  0.0024**  0.0047***   
  (0.0010)  (0.0011)   
L.YC (10Y-3M) +     0.0159*  
     (0.0079)  
L.YC (10Y-3M) -     -0.0029  
     (0.0084)  
L.YC (10Y-2Y) +      -0.0039 
      (0.0071) 
L.YC (10Y-2Y) -      -0.0104 
      (0.0127) 
Constant -0.0064*** -0.0052*** -0.0064*** -0.0061*** -0.0027** -0.0016 
 (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
       
Observations 2,564 2,564 2,564 2,564        2,553         2,553 
R-squared 0.1876 0.1871 0.1637 0.1634        0.1952         0.1945 
# of Banks 11 11 11 11       11        11 
Note: MRK, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. YC (10Y-3M) is 
the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-month Treasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference between 
the 10Y Treasury yield and the 2Y Treasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference between the 10-year yield and the 2-
year yield. + indicates a series of the yield curve based solely on positive movements and – indicates a series of the 
yield curve based solely on negative movements.. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 















Appendix A: List of Canadian Publicly Traded Banks 
Name Ticker Symbol Total Assets (MM) Net Income (MM) 
Bank of Montreal * BMO 781,126 2,218 
Bank of Nova Scotia * BNS 938,580 4,386 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce * CM 622,746 2,635 
Canadian Western Bank CWB 28,107 129 
Equitable Group  EQB 21,944 77 
Laurentian Bank of Canada LB 46,854 118 
National Bank of Canada * NA 266,879 1,049 
Royal Bank of Canada* RY 1,335,242 6,051 
State Street Capital Group SCB 8,897 13 
Toronto Dominion Bank * TD 1,325,821 5,233 
VersaBank 
 VB 1,765 8 
Note: There are 36 domestic (“Schedule I”) banks in Canada, but the 11 banks listed in this appendix are publicly 
traded. The “Big Six” banks account for approximately 92.7% of the total assets and contribute almost 92% of the 
credit to loan markets) according to the (Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada). A 
concentration ratio of 92.7% and a Herfindahl Index of 1679, suggests a moderately concentrated market structure. 
Data on total assets and net income (dollar amounts expressed in millions-MM) are extracted from the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Intuitions website (https://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/wt-ow/Pages/FINDAT.aspx) and 
numbers reported are from June 2018. Our sample of publicly traded banks is comprised of dividend-paying equity 
stocks * Denotes a “Big Six” bank. 
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